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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, JUSTICE KENNEDY, AND 
THE VIRTUES OF THE MIDDLE GROUND 
Allen Rostron* 
When the Supreme Court hears arguments this fall about the 
constitutionality of affirmative action policies at the University of Texas,1 
attention will be focused once again on Justice Anthony Kennedy. With the 
rest of the Court split between a bloc of four reliably liberal jurists and an 
equally solid cadre of four conservatives, the spotlight regularly falls on 
Kennedy, the swing voter that each side in every closely divided and 
ideologically charged case desperately hopes to attract. Critics condemn 
Kennedy for having an unprincipled, capricious, and self-aggrandizing style 
of decision-making.2 Though he is often decisive in the sense of casting the 
crucial vote that determines a case’s outcome, his opinions can be 
maddeningly indecisive in the sense of failing to establish clear rules of 
law. Yet in Fisher v. University of Texas, Kennedy’s irresolute nature may 
prove to be a blessing. By taking a middle-ground position that significantly 
sharpens judicial scrutiny of affirmative action programs but does not 
absolutely bar them, Kennedy can finesse the issue in a way that 
accommodates the American public’s conflicted feelings about racial 
preferences, but simultaneously forces everyone to start thinking more 
seriously about how racial components of affirmative action can be phased 
out in a manner that will minimize disruption and bitterness. 
I. A PATTERN OF SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE 
If Justice Kennedy winds up casting the deciding vote in Fisher, it will 
not be the first time that a middle-ground position taken by a single judge is 
decisive in a key Supreme Court case about affirmative action. When the 
Court first tackled the issue in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,3 Lewis Powell was the Justice who held sway. In that case, Allan 
Bakke, a white male, claimed that the medical school at the University of 
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California at Davis impermissibly discriminated against him by reserving 
sixteen out of one hundred seats in each entering class for applicants from 
disadvantaged minority groups.4 Four members of the Supreme Court 
thought the medical school’s admissions policy violated federal law,5 while 
four others saw no legal flaw in the school’s approach.6 That left Justice 
Powell to break the tie. While declaring that the medical school violated the 
Equal Protection Clause by fixing a rigid quota for minority students, 
Powell explained that he would approve a policy under which an 
applicant’s contribution to the school’s racial or ethnic diversity would be 
merely a “plus” factor in evaluating the applicant’s admission file.7 
A quarter of a century later, the Supreme Court returned to the question 
of affirmative action in a pair of cases involving the University of 
Michigan.8 At Michigan’s undergraduate College of Arts and Sciences, the 
admissions formula specified that an applicant from an underrepresented 
minority group would receive a 20-point boost toward the 100 points 
needed to guarantee admission.9 Michigan Law School, on the other hand, 
used no fixed formula or point system, but took the race of applicants into 
account to ensure the enrollment of a “critical mass” of minority students.10 
While most Supreme Court Justices saw no constitutionally significant 
difference between the college’s point system and the law school’s non-
numeric method, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Stephen Breyer 
distinguished the two—casting the pivotal votes to strike down the 
undergraduate college’s points-based policy but to uphold the law school’s 
more flexible and vague approach. Justice O’Connor added an unusual twist 
to her opinion by noting that it had been twenty-five years since Justice 
Powell’s landmark opinion in Bakke, and forecasting “that 25 years from 
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary” to ensure 
sufficient racial diversity in public universities.11 The Michigan cases thus 
represented “the apogee of split-the-difference pragmatism” rather than a 
clear victory for either side of the affirmative action debate.12 
More recently, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, the Supreme Court looked at race-based policies at 
the elementary and high school levels.13 Four Justices scoffed at the notion 
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that race should ever be a factor in deciding which pupils attend which 
schools within a district, flatly declaring that “[t]he way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”14 On the other hand, four Justices applauded the notion that a school 
district would make race a factor in school assignments in order to fulfill 
the promise of racial integration and to achieve a more level racial 
distribution across all schools within the district.15 Justice Kennedy emerged 
as the lone occupant of a middle ground; he provided the fifth vote for 
striking down the particular school district policies but declined to rule out 
the possibility that a school district could craft a race-conscious assignment 
policy that would remain safely within constitutional boundaries.16 
II. THE TEXAS SHOWDOWN 
While Justice O’Connor predicted that the use of racial preferences in 
higher education would be obsolete twenty-five years after Grutter and 
Gratz, many now wonder if affirmative action will survive that long. When 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fisher, widespread speculation 
ensued about whether the Court’s decision would mean the end of 
affirmative action.17 
The University of Texas has two principal mechanisms to increase the 
racial and ethnic diversity of its student body. First, the state’s “Top Ten 
Percent Law” provides for automatic admission of Texas high school 
seniors with grade point averages in the top tenth of their graduating 
classes.18 Second, in evaluating all other applications, the University uses a 
“holistic” approach that considers race as one of the “special 
circumstances” that can boost an applicant’s “personal achievement 
score.”19 Although the “Top Ten Percent Law” is superficially race-neutral, 
it has the purpose and effect of substantially increasing minority enrollment. 
It provides a route to admission without regard for standardized test 
scores20—which generally have been lower among minority students—and 
it takes advantage of persistent patterns of segregation where African-
American and Hispanic students in Texas live and go to high school.21 In 
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the lawsuit now pending before the Supreme Court, the challengers have 
not questioned the constitutionality of the “Top Ten Percent Law.” Instead 
they have focused their attack solely on the holistic, multi-factor approach 
to diversity that the University of Texas uses to assess the applicant pool 
remaining after applying the “Top Ten Percent Law.”22 The petitioners 
assert that—like the points-based policy in Gratz—the University of 
Texas’s “personal achievement score” is impermissibly automatic in its 
application and decisive in its effect on admissions decisions.23 
Fears that Fisher will bring the end of affirmative action have been 
exacerbated by the fact that Justice Elena Kagan—a member of the 
Supreme Court’s four-vote liberal bloc—will not participate in deciding the 
case. Kagan recused herself because she was the U.S. Solicitor General 
when the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in the case.24 But 
while Kagan’s absence might seem like a blow to proponents of affirmative 
action, it is actually unlikely to matter. If Kagan chose to participate in the 
case, the University of Texas would need five votes to prevail. The 
University would count on the support of Kagan and the Court’s other three 
liberals (Stephen Breyer, Ruth Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor) and it 
would hope that Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote for 
upholding the University’s affirmative action program. With Kagan not 
participating in the case, the University instead needs only four votes to 
win. That is because the Court will be reviewing a Fifth Circuit decision 
that upheld the University of Texas policies. In the event of a 4–4 tie, the 
Court would simply announce that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling was affirmed 
by an evenly divided court.25 Constitutional law would not be altered, and 
precedents like Grutter would escape unscathed. But again, to achieve that 
4–4 tie, the University needs to garner Justice Kennedy’s vote. In other 
words, Justice Kennedy’s vote would carry the day regardless of whether 
Kagan participates in the case. 
Anthony Kennedy is thus the University’s only hope, and that hope is 
exceedingly dim. Kennedy did not like the Michigan law school’s policy in 
Grutter, and there is little reason to think he will feel differently about the 
Texas version of the same basic holistic-review-to-get-a-critical-mass 
approach. If anything, the challenged Texas policy may look even worse to 
Kennedy than what he denounced in Grutter, given that it has a 
numerical—or “points”—component that the Grutter policy lacked and this 
component kicks in after the state’s “Top Ten Percent Law” has already 
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provided a large dose of diversity enhancement for the University of 
Texas’s incoming class. 
While it thus seems likely that the University of Texas policy will be 
struck down, the larger question is whether Justice Kennedy will simply 
denounce the Texas approach or instead go further and join the Court’s 
conservative quartet in putting a stop to affirmative action across the board. 
Based on Kennedy’s opinions in previous cases, the answer would be no. 
Although repeatedly voting with the conservatives in affirmative action 
cases, Kennedy has always conspicuously avoided signing on to more 
sweeping denunciations of all government consideration of race. In Grutter, 
he scorned the Michigan law school’s policy for pretending to consider all 
types of diversity while really being nothing more than a racial quota in a 
holistic disguise.26 But at the same time, he noted that “[t]here is no 
constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest factor 
among many others to achieve diversity.”27 Likewise, in Parents Involved, 
Kennedy voted to strike down the particular student/school assignment 
policies before the Court, but rejected his conservative colleagues’ “all-too-
unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my 
view, it may be taken into account.”28 Kennedy encouraged school districts 
to improve the racial balance of their schools in general ways, such as 
paying attention to race when choosing sites for new school buildings and 
when drawing up attendance zones, rather than by making race a factor in 
the individualized determinations about what school a particular student 
would attend.29 
Of course, Justice Kennedy might make a surprising turn to the left or 
right in Fisher. He might decide that even though he dissented in Grutter, 
that precedent now has the weight of stare decisis behind it, and it would be 
better for the Court to stand pat and let the remaining time run on Justice 
O’Connor’s 25-year clock. On the other hand, he might decide to eradicate 
affirmative action entirely, figuring that it is better to firmly shut the door to 
it rather than leave even a small crack through which government officials 
will continually try to squeeze too much. But the most likely outcome is 
that Kennedy will once again arrive at a middle ground, refusing to put a 
complete stop to affirmative action, but insisting that government officials 
must finally realize that rigorous strict scrutiny really and truly will apply. 
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III. SOMEWHERE BETWEEN ALL AND NOTHING 
The disadvantages of that sort of middle-ground outcome are obvious. 
No matter how hard Justice Kennedy might try to explain his views, he 
would be taking a position significantly more nuanced than simply saying 
“anything short of a full-blown quota is permissible” or “the Constitution 
requires complete color-blindness.” The waters inevitably will be muddied, 
leaving government officials and lower court judges to puzzle over exactly 
what Kennedy thinks the Constitution permits. Kennedy will be condemned 
again for failing to spell out a sufficiently clear and comprehensive set of 
requirements and restrictions. As Dahlia Lithwick whimsically imagined 
after the oral argument in Parents United, protestors might swarm the 
Supreme Court plaza to chant, “Two-four-six-eight, Justice Kennedy, make 
up some constitutional rules—you’re driving us freakin’ crazy.”30 
Yet that sort of frustration and uncertainty might be a price worth 
paying. Affirmative action is an issue about which many Americans have 
ambivalent, inconsistent feelings. Public opinion polls show that a strong 
majority of Americans favor affirmative action programs, but at the same 
time oppose racial preferences by an equally wide margin.31 This seeming 
contradiction results in part from ambiguity about the meaning of 
“affirmative action.”32 For example, that term could include efforts to 
encourage more minority students to apply to a university, without giving 
them any advantage when evaluating their applications. But the poll 
numbers also reflect a real struggle going on in many hearts and minds, as 
people try to reconcile their desire for racial equality with their commitment 
to judging individuals by merit.33 In one poll, only 36 percent of Americans 
said that affirmative action programs giving preferences to blacks and other 
minorities should be continued,34 but a few weeks later another poll found 
that 63 percent of Americans think such programs should be continued as 
long as they do not involve rigid quotas.35 Slight differences in the wording 
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of poll questions produce wild swings in the results because many 
Americans remain deeply conflicted about the issue, troubled by affirmative 
action but also wary of the consequences of wiping it away entirely. 
Thanks to swing voters like Lewis Powell, Sandra Day O’Connor, and 
Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court so far has avoided giving a simple 
“yes” or “no” answer to the affirmative action question. Instead, the 
constitutional rule has been, “it depends.” While that is not the most 
definitive or clear way to resolve the issue, it has created the opportunity to 
wait and see how much progress would be made in overcoming racial 
hostilities and disparities and to look for approaches that might best 
reconcile the competing interests at stake. In essence, even when the vote at 
the Supreme Court was nominally 5 to 4, the swing voters’ cautious, 
tempered approach ensured that the decision was really more of a 4½ to 4½ 
balancing act. 
Of course, the Supreme Court’s task is to interpret the Constitution 
rather than to follow public opinion polls. And on some issues, it will not be 
possible to give each side half a loaf. But where the Court and the nation 
are closely divided and a reasonable middle ground does exist, there is 
surely some value in the Court reaching a result that roughly corresponds to 
the median of the American public’s sentiments. Such a result at least lends 
legitimacy to the Court’s decisions in the eyes of the public. Moreover, the 
need for legitimacy may be particularly great in Fisher, given that it will be 
decided a year after the Supreme Court’s highly controversial ruling about 
the fate of the federal health care reform legislation.36 
When asked about the future of affirmative action, Barack Obama has 
acknowledged that it makes little sense to dwell on race alone. His 
daughters, for example, have enjoyed a privileged upbringing and would 
not deserve an advantage when they apply to college.37 The challenge, 
Obama recognized, is to move toward more sophisticated forms of 
affirmative action that take account of the persistent effects of racial 
discrimination but that do so by broadly considering all the circumstances 
that a person of any race has faced and the difficulties overcome.38 
When the Supreme Court decides Fisher, Justice Kennedy will have 
the chance to tell the nation that it is time to get serious about putting 
Obama’s prescription into practice. By making clear that judicial scrutiny of 
affirmative action policies will be genuinely strict, Kennedy can force 
governments to be more careful and selective about their reliance on race 
and to begin phasing out the use of racial distinctions where they are not 
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truly necessary. At the same time, by refusing to condemn categorically 
every form of race-based affirmative action, Kennedy can underscore that 
constitutional law will remain sensitive to the difficulties created by the 
profound role that race has played, and continues to play, in American 
society. The middle ground is not pure, neat, or simple, but sometimes it is 
the best place to stand. 
 
